Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...) a rehearsal of action-schemata. We contend they have problems to account for those cases in which inner speech is fragmentary, and for the difference with those instances in which it appears as more sentence-like. In addition, we present verbal overshadowing as a phenomenon that neither of them can easily explain. Finally, we propose an account in which inner speech is fundamentally silent outer speech and argue that it is more explanatory than the alternatives. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie's connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is heavily dependent on their notion of explicitness as (1) structural and (2) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. These assumptions unnecessarily constrain their position: the authors are forced to find an intrinsic property of patterns that accounts for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. Their candidate property, stability, does not capture this distinction. Yet, I show that we can drop assumptions (1) and (2) and still develop a vehicle theory of consciousness. (...) This alternative is better served by models that incorporate both connectionist and symbolic representations. (shrink)

En este artículo examinamos la última propuesta de Carruthers acerca del papel del lenguaje en cuanto emisor global de pensamientos en una arquitectura masivamente modular, centrándonos en dos aspectos: el habla interna como integrador intermodular y su función para explicar la creatividad de la cognición humana. En primer lugar argumentamos que el lenguaje no es suficiente para la integración intermodular, a partir de lo que llamamos el "problema de la audiencia": las oraciones compuestas por el módulo lingüístico, que incorporan información (...) de distintos dominios, son ininteligibles para cada módulo central, que es de dominio específico. Como alternativa, consideramos la posibilidad de que exista integración sin que sea llevada a cabo por ningún módulo en concreto. Finalmente sostenemos que la propuesta de Carruthers para el pensamiento creativo no respeta la fenomenología ni la ambigüedad del lenguaje. Defendemos que un sistema relacionado con la "lectura de mentes", cuya función es crucial para la comunicación lingüística, debe tener un papel mucho más importante. This paper examines Carruthers's latest proposal on the role of language as a global broadcaster of thoughts in a massively modular architecture. We focus on two aspects: inner speech as an intermodular integrator, and its function to explain creativity in human cognition. First, we argue that language is not sufficient for intermodular integration from what we call "the audience problem": sentences composed by the linguistic module, combining information from different domains, would be unintelligible to each central module, which is domain-specific. As an alternative, we consider the possibility that there is integration not carried out by a specific module. Finally, we claim that Carruthers's proposal for creative thinking respects neither the phenomenology nor the ambiguity of language. We contend that a mindreading system, which has a crucial function in linguistic communication, must have a much more important role to play. (shrink)

Many pragmaticians have distinguished three levels of meaning involved in the comprehension of utterances, and there is an ongoing debate about how to characterize the intermediate level. Recanati has called it the level of 'what is said' and has opposed the idea that it can be determined semantically - a position that he labels 'pragmatic minimalism lo this end he has offered two chief arguments: semantic underdeterminacy and the Availability Principle. This paper exposes a tension between both arguments, relating this (...) discussion with Carruthers's cognitive view of language, according to which some thoughts are, literally, sentences of our natural language. First we explain how this view entails minimalism, and we construct an argument based on semantic underdeterminacy that shows that natural language sentences do not have the compositional properties required to constitute thoughts. Then we analyze the example of a subject's overhearing a sentence without an interpretive context, arguing that in the light of the Availability Principle the corresponding thought can be regarded as a natural language sentence. Thus, semantic underdeterminacy and availability pull in different directions, and we claim that there is no characterization of the latter that can relieve this tension. We contend that Recanati's availability shares with Carruthers's introspectivism an overreliance on intuitions about what appears consciously in one's mmd. We conclude, therefore, that the Availability Principle ought to be abandoned. (shrink)

Many pragmaticians have distinguished three levels of meaning involved in the comprehension of utterances, and there is an ongoing debate about how to characterize the intermediate level. Recanati has called it the level of ‘what is said’ and has opposed the idea that it can be determined semantically — a position that he labels ‘pragmatic minimalism’. To this end he has offered two chief arguments: semantic underdeterminacy and the Availability Principle. This paper exposes a tension between both arguments, relating this (...) discussion with Carruthers’s cognitive view of language, according to which some thoughts are, literally, sentences of our natural language. First we explain how this view entails minimalism, and we construct an argument based on semantic underdeterminacy that shows that natural language sentences do not have the compositional properties required to constitute thoughts. Then we analyze the example of a subject’s overhearing a sentence without an interpretive context, arguing that in the light of the Availability Principle the corresponding thought can be regarded as a natural language sentence. Thus, semantic underdeterminacy and availability pull in different directions, and we claim that there is no characterization of the latter that can relieve this tension. We contend that Recanati’s availability shares with Carruthers’s introspectivism an overreliance on intuitions about what appears consciously in one’s mind. We conclude, therefore, that the Availability Principle ought to be abandoned. (shrink)

I address the problem of the distinction between semantic and conceptual representations from general considerations about how to distinguish a representational kind. I consider three different ways of telling representational kinds apart – in terms of structure, processing and content – and I examine if semantic representations may constitute a distinct kind with respect to each of them. I argue that the best options for semantic representation to be regarded as a distinct representational kind with respect to each of the (...) three criteria conflict with each other, since it appears respectively as an atomic representation, as a sort of procedural rule or as a structured complex. (shrink)

Contextualist theorists have recently defended the views (a) that metaphor-processing can be treated on a par with other meaning changes, such as narrowing or transfer, and (b) that metaphorical contents enter into “what is said” by an utterance. We do not dispute claim (a) but consider that claim (b) is problematic. Contextualist theorists seem to leave in the hands of context the explanation about why it is that some meaning changes are directly processed, and thus plausibly form part of “what (...) is said”, while some others are not. While granting the role of context in this respect, we contend that there are elements that play an instrumental role in providing direct access to the metaphorical content, namely, the conventionality of the expressions and the salience of the concepts involved. We will start by criticizing Recanati’s and Relevance Theory’s accounts of metaphor. Then we examine the claims of Carston’s and Giora’s two-process accounts that set the stage for a revision of the main elements involved, namely, the properties of conventionality and salience. Finally we examine a number of representative examples, explaining why some cases involve a direct access to the metaphorical content and others require an intermediate non-figurative interpretation. (shrink)

The systematicity argument only challenges connectionism if systematicity is a general property of cognition. I examine this thesis in terms of properties of concepts. First, I propose that Evans's Generality Constraint only applies to attributions of belief. Then I defend a variety of conceptual pluralism, arguing that concepts share two fundamental properties related to centrality and belief-attribution, and contending that there are two kinds of concepts that differ in their compositional properties. Finally, I rely on Dual Systems Theory and on (...) differences between animal and human cognition to suggest a scenario of two processing systems that work on different kinds of concepts, with only one of them supporting full systematicity. I sketch a non-classical systematicity argument that rules out classicism as the basis of one of those systems given that it would wrongly entail that both systems are fully systematic. (shrink)

Amodality is the thesis that concepts are not constituted by modal-specific representations. In this paper I assess the prospects for uncovering support for this claim in language by two different means. First, I examine the question of the amodal character of abstract concepts, but find it to be inconclusive pending a clearer account of the role of sensorimotor representations in language processing. Second, I evaluate the possibility of there being amodal primitive concepts in the context of Carey’s account of representational (...) primitives in core cognition. Despite their alleged iconicity, which seems to favor a modal view, I contend that there are grounds for regarding them as amodal in nature. I also challenge the discontinuity thesis that regards early primitives as being unrelated to mature, newly linguistically created primitives. (shrink)

Parental burnout is a unique and context-specific syndrome resulting from a chronic imbalance of risks over resources in the parenting domain. The current research aims to evaluate the psychometric properties of the Spanish version of the Parental Burnout Assessment across Spanish-speaking countries with two consecutive studies. In Study 1, we analyzed the data through a bifactor model within an Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling on the pooled sample of participants obtaining good fit indices. We then attained measurement invariance across both gender (...) and countries in a set of nested models with gradually increasing parameter constraints. Latent means comparisons across countries showed that among the participants’ countries, Chile had the highest parental burnout score, likewise, comparisons across gender evidenced that mothers displayed higher scores than fathers, as shown in previous studies. Reliability coefficients were high. In Study 2, we tested the relations between parental burnout and three specific consequences, i.e., escape and suicidal ideations, parental neglect, and parental violence toward one’s children. The medium to large associations found provided support for the PBA’s predictive validity. Overall, we concluded that the Spanish version of the PBA has good psychometric properties. The results support its relevance for the assessment of parental burnout among Spanish-speaking parents, offering new opportunities for cross-cultural research in the parenting domain. (shrink)

Este trabajo intenta clasificar la noción de contenido no conceptual, centrándose especialmente en su pretendida autonomía respecto al contenido conceptual. Se discute críticamente el Principio de Autonomía de Bermúdez y, frente a él, se argumenta a favor de la existencia de relaciones de interdependencia entre el contenido no conceptual y el contenido conceptual.

The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This article aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid concepts and conclude that, (...) even if not successful, they challenge hybridism to find a robust criterion for concept individuation and to show an explanatory advantage for hybrid concepts. Then we propose such a criterion of individuation, which we will call ‘functional stable coactivation’. Finally, we examine the prospects of hybridism to understand what is involved in recent approaches to categorization and meaning extraction. 1 The Heterogeneity of Conceptual Representations2 Two Challenges for Hybrid Concepts: Individuation and Explanation2.1 The coordination criterion2.2 Concepts as constituents of thoughts3 Individuating Hybrids: Functional Stable Coactivation4 The Explanatory Power of Hybrid Concepts4.1 Categorization4.2 Meaning extraction4.2.1 Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries4.2.2 Polysemy and hybrid concepts5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols [Hurlburt, R. T., and C. L. Heavey. 2006. Exploring Inner Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Hurlburt, R. T., and S. A. Akhter. 2008. “Unsymbolized Thinking.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 : 1364–1374]. Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. This paper analyzes (...) the main properties of unsymbolized thinking and advances an explanation of its origin. According to our analysis, unsymbolized thoughts appear as propositional states, that is, they are experienced as compositional conceptual phenomena, with semantic and syntactic features analogous to those of the contents of utterances. Based on this characterization, we hypothesize that UT is continuous with the activity of inner speech, in particular, it i... (shrink)

: This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe they (...) are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language. (shrink)

Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily (...) on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as grounded on social interaction mechanisms, conceptually driven, possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two. (shrink)

This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the "argument from explicitness"—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: (1) the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and (2) natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe (...) they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language. (shrink)

We very often discover ourselves engaged in inner speech. It seems that this kind of silent, private, speech fulfils some role in our cognition, most probably related to conscious thinking. Yet, the study of inner speech has been neglected by philosophy and psychology alike for many years. However, things seem to have changed in the last two decades. Here we review some of the most influential accounts about the phenomenology and the functions of inner speech, as well as the methodological (...) problems that affect its study. (shrink)

: According to the thesis of semantic underdetermination, most sentences of a natural language lack a definite semantic interpretation. This thesis supports an argument against the use of natural language as an instrument of thought, based on the premise that cognition requires a semantically precise and compositional instrument. In this paper we examine several ways to construe this argument, as well as possible ways out for the cognitive view of natural language in the introspectivist version defended by Carruthers. Finally, we (...) sketch a view of the role of language in thought as a specialized tool, showing how it avoids the consequences of semantic underdetermination. (shrink)

According to the thesis of semantic underdetermination, most sentences of a natural language lack a definite semantic interpretation. This thesis supports an argument against the use of natural language as an instrument of thought, based on the premise that cognition requires a semantically precise and compositional instrument. In this paper we examine several ways to construe this argument, as well as possible ways out for the cognitive view of natural language in the introspectivist version defended by Carruthers. Finally, we sketch (...) a view of the role of language in thought as a specialized tool, showing how it avoids the consequences of semantic underdetermination. (shrink)

Different languages carve the world in different categories. They also encode events in differ­ent ways, conventionalize different metaphorical mappings, and differ in their rule-based metonymies and patterns of meaning extensions. A long-standing, and controversial, ques­tion is whether this variability in the languages generates a corresponding variability in the conceptual structure of the speakers of those languages. Here we will present and discuss three interesting general proposals by focusing on representative authors of such proposals. The proposals are the following: first, that (...) the effect of language in conceptualization is general and deep; second, that the effect is local, transient, shallow and easily revisable; and third, that there is no proper effect of language on conceptualization, although there is surely some cognitive impact of language: many conceptual tasks engage language one way or another. (shrink)

Research in cognitive science has often assumed the existence of a privileged level that unifies theoretical explanations arising from different disciplines. Philosophical accounts differ about the locus of those intertheory relations. In this paper, four different views are analyzed: classical, connectionist, pragmatist, and reductionist, as exemplified in the works of von Eckardt, Horgan and Tienson, Hardcastle, and Bickle, respectively. Their divergences are characterized in terms of the possibility of such a privileged level. The classical view favors a privileged computational level. (...) The connectionist revision tries to draw biological intuitions into computational models to provide a link between neurons and computations. The pragmatist approach rejects the idea of a privileged level and offers a more eclectic view of cognitive theory building. The reductionist account pursues theoretical unification by means of the reduction of higher level theories to basic level ones. /// La investigatión en ciencia cognitiva suele asumir la existencia de un nivel privilegiado que unifica las explicaciones teóricas provenientes de distintas disciplinas. Las interpretaciones filósoficas difieren respecto al locus de tales relaciones interteóricas. En este artículo se analizan cuatro concepciones: clásica, conexionista, pragmática y reduccionista, ejemplificadas respectivamente en las obras de von Eckardt, Horgan y Tienson, Hardcastle y Bickle. Sus divergencias se caracterizan en términos de la posible existencia del nivel privilegiado. El enfoque clásico propugna un nivel privilegiado computacional. La revisión conexionista importa intuiciones de la biología a los modelos computacionales, con la intentión de vincular lo neuronal con lo computacional. El enfoque pragmático rechaza la idea de un nivel privilegiado y ofrece una visión más ecléctica de la teorización cognitiva. La conceptión reduccionista promueve la unificatión teórica mediante la reductión de teorías de alto nivel a teorías de nivel básico. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing Δ₁¹-comprehension (...) schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

We show how to interpret intuitionistic propositional logic into a predicative second-order intuitionistic propositional system having only the conditional and the universal second-order quantifier. We comment on this fact. We argue that it supports the legitimacy of using classical logic in a predicative setting, even though the philosophical cast of predicativism is nonrealistic. We also note that the absence of disjunction and existential quantifications allows one to have a process of normalization of proofs that avoids the use of "commuting conversions.".

As public administrations adopt artificial intelligence (AI), we see this transition has the potential to transform public service and public policies, by offering a rapid turnaround on decision making and service delivery. However, a recent series of criticisms have pointed to problematic aspects of mainstreaming AI systems in public administration, noting troubled outcomes in terms of justice and values. The argument supplied here is that any public administration adopting AI systems must consider and address ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding two key (...) dimensions: the algorithms’ results, and how public managers make decisions for and about AI systems’ design. The article is based on bibliographic research in institutional theory perspective that relates the design of AI systems and relevant literature on the decision-making process in public policy. The main finding is to explain why autonomous decision systems continue to reproduce ambiguities and uncertainties when applied in public administration and propose a reflection on AI governance in public administration. This article points to the need for design institutions that immerse themselves in understanding the nuances, details, and potential outcomes of AI governance for public administration. Such institutions would reconcile consequentialist logic with a logic of appropriateness to help navigate and mediate ambiguities and uncertainties. (shrink)

It has been known for six years that the restriction of Girard's polymorphic system $\text{\bfseries\upshape F}$ to atomic universal instantiations interprets the full fragment of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. We firstly observe that Tait's method of “convertibility” applies quite naturally to the proof of strong normalization of the restricted Girard system. We then show that each $\beta$-reduction step of the full intuitionistic propositional calculus translates into one or more $\beta\eta$-reduction steps in the restricted Girard system. As a consequence, we obtain (...) a novel and perspicuous proof of the strong normalization property for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. It is noticed that this novel proof bestows a crucial role to $\eta$-conversions. (shrink)

A partir de las nuevas condiciones que la revolución copernicana del conocimiento le impone a la posible validez objetiva de ciertos conceptos que no dicen relación con la experiencia, el autor de este artículo se aboca al esfuerzo de mostrar el significado del concepto de dignidad en el contexto moderno del discurso sobre los derechos humanos. El punto de apoyo original de la reflexión que aquí se lleva a cabo lo constituye la conocida distinción kantiana entre dignidad y precio. Desde (...) allí se desarrolla una argumentación que gira en torno al concepto de vida como aquello que ocurre entre los hombres, al ejercicio propiamente racional de justificar y a la idea de comunidad como la única capaz de asumir y contener la pluralidad de los seres humanos. (shrink)

We introduce a new typed combinatory calculus with a type constructor that, to each type σ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\sigma $$\end{document}, associates the star type σ∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\sigma ^*$$\end{document} of the nonempty finite subsets of elements of type σ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\sigma $$\end{document}. We prove that this calculus enjoys the properties of strong normalization and confluence. With the aid of this star combinatory (...) calculus, we define a functional interpretation of first-order predicate logic and prove a corresponding soundness theorem. It is seen that each theorem of classical first-order logic is connected with certain formulas which are tautological in character. As a corollary, we reprove Herbrand’s theorem on the extraction of terms from classically provable existential statements. (shrink)

Commuting conversions were introduced in the natural deduction calculus as ad hoc devices for the purpose of guaranteeing the subformula property in normal proofs. In a well known book, Jean-Yves Girard commented harshly on these conversions, saying that ‘one tends to think that natural deduction should be modified to correct such atrocities.’ We present an embedding of the intuitionistic predicate calculus into a second-order predicative system for which there is no need for commuting conversions. Furthermore, we show that the redex (...) and the conversum of a commuting conversion of the original calculus translate into equivalent derivations by means of a series of bidirectional applications of standard conversions. (shrink)

We introduce a herbrandized functional interpretation of a first-order semi-intuitionistic extension of Heyting Arithmetic and study its main properties. We then extend the interpretation to a certain system of second-order arithmetic which includes a (classically false) formulation of the FAN principle and weak König's lemma. It is shown that any first-order formula provable in this system is classically true. It is perhaps worthy of note that, in our interpretation, second-order variables are interpreted by finite sets of natural numbers.

We define a notion of realizability, based on a new assignment of formulas, which does not care for precise witnesses of existential statements, but only for bounds for them. The novel form of realizability supports a very general form of the FAN theorem, refutes Markov's principle but meshes well with some classical principles, including the lesser limited principle of omniscience and weak König's lemma. We discuss some applications, as well as some previous results in the literature.

When is humanitarian intervention legitimate and how should such interventions be conducted? This article sets out eight liberal principles that underlie humanitarian intervention, some of them abstract principles of international ethics and others more concrete principles that apply specifically to humanitarian intervention. It argues that whilst these principles do not determine the legitimacy of particular interventions, they should ?incline? our judgments towards approval or disapproval. The basic principles include the liberal idea that governments are the mere agents of the people, (...) that tyrannical governments forfeit their legal protections, that human rights entail obligations for governments, that justifiable intervention must intend the end of tyranny or anarchy, that the doctrine of double-effect should be respected, that intervention is only warranted in severe cases, that intervention be welcomed by those it is intended to save, and that ideally it is welcomed by the community of democratic states. (shrink)

Teson critiques a recent article by John Rawls in which Rawls extends his acclaimed political theory to include international relations.

Notions of disambiguation supporting a compositional interpretation ofvambiguous expressions and reflecting intuitions about how sentences combinevin discourse are investigated. Expressions are analyzed both inductively byvbreaking them apart, and co-inductively by embedding them within larger contexts.

In the course of ten short sections, we comment on Gödel's seminal dialectica paper of fifty years ago and its aftermath. We start by suggesting that Gödel's use of functionals of finite type is yet another instance of the realistic attitude of Gödel towards mathematics, in tune with his defense of the postulation of ever increasing higher types in foundational studies. We also make some observations concerning Gödel's recasting of intuitionistic arithmetic via the dialectica interpretation, discuss the extra principles that (...) the interpretation validates and comment on extensionality and higher order equality. The latter sections focus on the role of majorizability considerations within the dialectica and related interpretations for extracting computational information from ordinary proofs in mathematics. (shrink)

Resumo Longe de pretender esgotar possíveis semelhanças entre Nietzsche e Quine, o texto que se segue tenciona mostrar, mediante comparações paradigmáticas e admissíveis convergências metodológicas, como ambos os autores, lançando mão de hipóteses naturalistas para interpretar o conhecimento e a estética, respectivamente, tornam possível pensar num naturalismo menos confinante e mais inventivo, livre dos prejuízos do cientificismo e mais condizente com a sensibilidade artística em geral.Far from intending to exhaust all the possible similarities between Nietzsche and Quine, the following text (...) aims at showing, through paradigmatic comparisons and admissible methodological convergences, how both authors - by making naturalistic assumptions to interpret knowledge and aesthetics respectively - allow us to think of a less confining and more creative naturalism, free from the prejudices of scientism and more compatible with the artistic sensibility in general. (shrink)

This book provides methods and practical cases and experiences with the aim of stimulating Responsible Research and Innovation through the direct engagement of researchers, Civil Society Organisations, citizens, industry stakeholders, policy and decision makers, research funders and communicators. The book furthermore aims to advance debate on Responsible Research and Innovation and also to reinforce the RRI community identity. With chapters covering governance, public engagement and inclusion in responsible R&D and innovation processes; RRI actions in science education and communication; gender and (...) ethical issues in RRI initiatives; and sustainability of RRI processes, the book is solidly part of the Europe 2020 strategy to promote a vision for a stronger collaborations between social, natural and physical scientists and the societal actors for a wider dimensions of science and innovation and the role in environmental preservation. (shrink)